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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a conviction of second-degree felony theft 
in the Second District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(3) (Supp. 
1986). 
Charles Edward Massey was charged with committing the crimes of 
burglary# a second-degree felony/ and theft/ a second-degree 
felony/ in West Point/ County of Davis/ State of Utah/ on or about 
March 22nd through March 24th, 1987. After deliberation, the jury 
reached a verdict of guilty of theft/ a second-degree felony/ and 
not guilty of burglary/ a second-degree felony. Defendant made a 
Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Arrest of Judgment, On August 
11/ 1987, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby denied both motions and 
sentenced Charles Edward Massey to prison for one to fifteen years. 
iii 
Did the State produce insufficient evidence to convict Defendant 
of Theft? 
Did the State fail to produce enough evidence to give the State 
jurisdiction of the alleged theft by Defendant? 
Did the Court improperly instruct the jury and impermissibly 
shift the burden of proof? 
iv 
oiniunjfi.1 riujv xoiuno 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V, - No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I Sec. 12 - In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal 
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOT. 76-1-201 - Jurisdiction of Offenses. 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense 
which he commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct, 
or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within the 
state; or 
(b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to 
commit an offense within the state; or 
(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to 
commit an offense within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy 
occurs in the state; or 
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, soli-
citation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the 
laws of both this state and such other jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the 
conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an 
element, occurs within this state. In homicide the "result" is either the 
physical contact which causes death, or the death itself; and if the body 
of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death shall be presumed 
to have occurred within the state. 
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed 
by the law of this state is committed within the state regardless of the 
location of the offender at the time of the omission • 
v 
UTAH CODE ANNOT. 76-4-201 - Conspiracy. 
A person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that 
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons 
to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and any one of them 
commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. 
VI 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. That there was insufficient evidence at trial to confer 
jurisdiction on Defendant in Utah and to convict him of theft in Utah. 
2. The jury was improperly instructed in that they were told 
that they could make a finding of guilty on a limited number of factors to 
the exclusion of other factors. 
3. The factors upon which they were permitted to make a finding 
of guilt impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and allowed the court 
to improperly place excessive weight on Defendant's failure to take the stand. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 24, 1987, Dennis Bingham went to 3510 West 1300 North, 
West Point, Utah (R. 11-12) • Mr, Bingham, son-in-law of Lee and 
Norma Thompson, discovered the house had been broken into and 
numerous items taken (R. 12-14). The house was last secured on 
March 22, 1987 (R. 19). Both Lee and Norma testified no one had 
permission to take any items that had been taken from the residence 
(R. 55-69). Kenneth Wayne Hodgson, a patrolman for the Oregon 
State Police (R. 105) testified that he stopped Charles Edward 
Massey on March 28, 1987, in Deschutes County, Oregon (R. 
106). Mr. Massey was in a 1977 Monte Carlo registered to him (R. 
106). Trooper Hodgson testified to several items of property in 
the vehicle (R. 108, 110, 111, 112, 117). The items of property 
found in Mr. Massey*s vehicle and in his coat in Deschutes County, 
Oregon, were identified either by Mr. Lee Thompson or Norma 
Thompson as property they owned and had left at the residence in 
West Point, Utah (R. 35-55, 65-69). The jury came back with a not 
guilty on the burglary and guilty on the theft charge. At 
sentencing, counsel for Mr. Massey moved to arrest judgment 
pursuant to Section 77-35-23 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, for lack of 
jurisdiction and also moved the Court to dismiss the charges 
pursuant to Section 77-35-25 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, also for lack 
of jurisdiction. Both motions were denied by the judge. 
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POINT I 
THE STATE FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO GIVE THE 
TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION UNDER U.C.A. SECTION 7(>-l-201 TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT MASSEY OF THEFT AS CHARGED IN THE 
INFORMATION. 
The Utah Criminal Code clearly sets forth the circumstances 
under which a person may be prosecuted in the State of Utah for an 
alleged criminal offense. Section 76-1-201 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as amended, provides: 
76-1-201. Jurisdiction of Offenses 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an 
offense which he commits/ while either within or outside the 
state, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is 
legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly 
within the state; or 
(b) The conduct outside the stae constitutes an attempt 
to commit an offense within the state; or 
(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a 
conspiracy to commit an offense within the state and an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or 
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction 
an offense under the laws of both this state and such other 
jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either 
the conduct which an element of the offense, or the result 
which is such an element, occurs within this state. In 
homicide the "result" is either the physical contact which 
causes death, or the death itself; and if the body of a 
homicide is found within the state, the death shall be 
presumed to have occurred within the state. 
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a 
duty imposed by the law of this state is committed within the 
state regardless of the location of the offender at the time 
of the omission. 
The jury found Mr. Massey not guilty of the burglary charge in 
Count One of a Two Count Information, and convicted him of the 
theft charge in Count Two of the Information. Thus, in order to 
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convict Mr. Massey of the theft charge, the State had the burden of 
showing that the alleged theft occurred within Davis County. 
Defendant Massey herein contends that the State failed to prove 
that the alleged theft offense occurred within Davis County, Utah 
and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction because 
Defendant Masseyfs alleged theft fits none of the circumstances 
enumerated in U.C.A. 78-1-201. It is of course, axiomatic that 
some constituent element of the alleged offense must have occurred 
within the State in order
 to confer jurisdiction upon the trial 
court to convict Defendant Massey of the alleged offense. 
See, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 685, 691-695. It is not controverted that 
evidence was introduced at trial that Mr. Massey was in possession 
or had constructive possession of some items taken from the 
Thompson house. However/ all of the evidence introduced at trial 
tended to prove that Mr. Massey possessed and/or had constructive 
possession of stolen goods in Oregon, not in Utah. There is 
absolutely no evidence to show that Mr. Massey committed a theft in 
Utah and/or obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
stolen property while in Utah. In fact, it is arguable that the 
jury's verdict on the burglary charge suggests that none of the 
constituent elements of the theft offense charged against Mr. 
Massey occurred within the State of Utah. 
U.C.A. 76-1-201 sets forth three different factual situations 
under which the Court has the requisite jurisdiction to convict a 
person of theft. The first factual situation (Sec. 76-1-201(1)(a) 
U.C.A. as amended) requires that the offense, in this case theft, 
be committed wholly or partly within the State. While it is true 
4 
___, j ~**~ w«ivxiiy or tine stolen property 
occurred within the State of Utah, Mr. Massey was found not guilty 
of the burglary. The jury's not guilty verdict on the burglary 
charge implies a finding that Mr. Massey did not take any items 
from the home in West Point. Thus, in order for the jury's theft 
conviction to stand there must be some evidence that Mr. Massey 
obtained and/or exercised unauthorized control over the stolen 
property while in the State of Utah. A review of the trial 
transcript indicates that there is no fact or evidence to show that 
Mr. Massey obtained and/or exercised unauthorized control over the 
stolen property while in Utah. At best, the evidence showed that 
Mr. Massey had possession of the stolen property in Oregon, not 
Utah. Thus, it follows that Oregon, not Utah had the requisite 
jurisdiction to convict Mr. Massey of theft. 
There was no evidence or testimony presented at trial to 
satisfy the second factual circumstance set forth in U.C.A 76-1-
201(1)(b). In other words, all of the evidence presented at trial 
points to conduct in Oregon and not to any conduct which would 
constitute an attempt to commit a criminal offense in Utah. 
Finally, the state failed to prove circumstances which would 
satisfy the third requirement under U.C.A. 76-1-201(1)(c) that 
conduct outside the state constitute a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within the state and an act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy occurs within the state. U.C.A. 76-4-401 (1953), 
amended, defines conspiracy as follows: 
"A person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that 
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or 
more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such 
conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance 
of the conspiracy." 
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The trial transcript in the instant proceeding does not set forth any evidence 
which would indicate that the Mr. Massey was guilty of conspiracy. More 
importantly, the State does not allege conspiracy in their information. Thus 
U.C.A Section 76-l-201(lXc) does not apply under the circumstances of the 
instant case. 
Although there is scant case law interpreting U.C.A. Section 76-1-201 the 
existing cases make i t abundantly clear that at least on element constituting 
the offense must occur within the state in order for the court to have the 
requisite jurisdiction to convict a defendant of the offense. See for example, 
State v. Simpson, 541 P. 2d 1114, 1116 (Utah, 1975). In the instant case, the 
inference of the jury's not guilty verdict on the burglary charge is that Mr. 
Massey did not obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the stolen property 
in West Point, Utah. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial proves only 
that Mr. Massey exercised unauthorized control over the property while in 
Oregon. The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to convict Mr, Massey 
of the theft offense. 
POINT H 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
IN THE INSTANT PROCEEDING WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AGAINST 
APPELLANT BASED UPON THE CHARGE CONTAINED 
IN THE INFORMATION. 
A reviewing court has the authority to review a case on the sufficiency 
of the evidence. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court 
stated ". . . notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision 
this Court still has the right to review the suffiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict." The Utah Supreme Court then stated the standard to be applied: 
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.. ~ *wrwxoc: a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence [viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict] 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently inprobable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. Id. 
This standard restates the Due Process requirements which prohibit a criminal 
conviction in all cases except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with whidi the defendant was charged, 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 397 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) 
In the present case, Mr. Massey could have been found to have constructive 
possession of property of the theft in Oregon. However, nothing at trial was 
offered to indicate that Mr. Massey had obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over these items at West Point, County of Davis, State of Utah on 
or about the 22nd through the 24th days of March, 1987. 
The probable cause statement stated that two screwdrivers were ident i f ied 
as belonging to the defendant. However at trial no evidence was introduced 
that those screwdrivers belonged to Defendant on or about the time the offense 
is alleged to have occurred. (T. 1-166.) Thus the court should have sustained 
Defense counsel's motion to dismiss after the State presented their case should 
have been granted as to the theft charge. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
THAT THEY COULD INFER THAT DEFENDANT 
STOLE THE PROPERTY IN HIS POSSESSION IF HIS 
POSSESSION WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED 
Instruction No. 14 was presented as follows : 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily explained, is 
ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference 
and find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in 
the case, that the person in possession stole the property. 
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Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt(1) that 
the defendant was in possession of property, (2) that the property was stolen, 
(3) that such possession was not too remote in point of time from the theft, 
and (4) that no satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts and find that 
the defendant stole the property. 
The U.S. Constitution and the Utah State Constitution allows the defendant 
the right to remain silent and the right not to be "compelled to give evidence 
against himself" U.S. Constitution Amendment V, UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. 
I & 12. The instruction as given requires the Defendant to satisfactorily explain 
his possession of recently stolen property. In this trial Defendant did not testify 
so the jury wasinstructedthat they could infer that the property in his 
possession was stolen because at trial he made no explanation let alone a satis-
factory explantion as to why he may have possessed the property. This infringes 
upon Defendant's right to remain silent. 
This case is similar to Griffin v. California 380 U.S. 609 (1965), wherein 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that where the substance of an instruction that 
allows State the privilege of tendering to the jury for i ts consideration 
the failure of the accused to testify, that reversible error occurs. 
This occurred even though the jury was instructed that the defendant has 
a constitutional right not to testify, (Id.) 
In the instant case the court explained that his failure to satisfactorily 
explain his possession of stolen property could infer his guilt which could solemnize 
the silence of the accused into evidence against him. (Id). 
8 
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 *** The Act was framed with a due regard to those who 
might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives 
to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely 
venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent of the charge against 
him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to 
explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against 
him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase 
rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however 
honest, who would therefore willingly be placed on the witness stand. The 
statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned 
might refuse to ask to be witnesses, particularly when they may have been 
in some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that 
the failure of a defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witness 
shall not create any presumption against him." 
In the instant case the instruction impermisslbably allowed the jury to infer 
Defendant's guilt where he remained silent. 
This case is distinguishable from State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 
1985), and State v. Smith-726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986), because the jury was 
instructed in the instant case that this instruction allows more than an infer-
ence of guilt as in those cases but allows the jury to make a finding of guilt 
based upon the enumerated facts in Instruction 14 as recited above. The trial 
court erroneously stated,based upon four elements recited in the instruction 
and those four elements alone, that a juror may flinfer from those facts and 
find that the defendant stole the property.ff R. at Instruction No. 14. 
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POINT IV 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 IMPERMISSABLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
It is beyond controversy that the burden is upon the prosecution to 
prove all elements of a criminal offense. UTAH CODE ANNOT. Section 76-
1-501 (1953 as amended) provides: 
ffA defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
This standard is found in federal and constitutional law as well. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature 
of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the 
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970) 
Utah Const, art. I Section 7 provides: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law." 
As shown, the burden upon the State to prove every element of a criminal 
offense is an essential ingredient to due process requirements and is premised 
in both federal and state law. 
Instruction No. 14 as enumerated in Point III is faulty for another 
reason. It is prejudicial because it states that the jury may infer and find 
that the defendant stole the property he possessed merely from the elements 
listed in the instruction which include four elements which do not include 
all the elements necessary for a conviction of theft or all the circumstances 
which should be considered in passing upon whether or not Defendant stole 
the property. 
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Thus the jury was given the opportunity in instruction no. 14 to give 
a directed verdict on what are the elements of theft irregardless of what 
they felt about other evidence that showed that no theft took place in 
Utah. See United States v. Bosch, 505 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 1974). 
The trial court in effect did what concerned the Utah Supreme Court 
in other cases in that it erroneously addresses the issue of guilt and 
relieves the state of its burden of proof. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 
321 (Utah 1985), State v. Pacheo, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985). This 
instruction does harm by "singling out and emphasizing particular evidence 
in a cause to the exclusion of other evidence which may be of equal or 
greater importance, and without further explanation or direction, may tend 
to convey direction, May tend to convey to the jury that when such enumerated 
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to the accused, which 
if not sustained by him, requires the verdict to be case against him." 
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 at 327 (Utah 1985). 
This instuction follows that logic by directing the jury that they 
may make a finding of guilt based solely on what is enumerated in Instruction 
No. 14 to the exclusion of other evidence. Thus the instruction constitutes 
reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant should have his conviction dismissed and vacated or a new 
trial ordered based on the above points. 
Dated this / 1 day of February, 1 
David^Grindstaff 
Attorney for Appellant^ 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of 
the foregoing brief, postage prepaid, first-class mail, to Sandra Sjogren, 
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, this jO^ _ day of February, 1988. 
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I'v.-ti County Attorney ....... .. o„ 
M<<norirtl Courthouse Buildinq
 ; .- r 
Farmington, Utah 84025 o : . . ;-. , . i,. i 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY ^ STKRjr, OF;TJT$X-
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Bail 20j oo <*•••" 
INFORMATION 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHARLEY MASSEY, 
Defendant. 
4 
iZilLLiiLltJ-Slt-JtfisMi 
The undersigned affiant, Glenn Parker, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about the 22nd 
through and 24th days of March, 1987, at West Point, County of 
Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of: 
COUNT ONE 
BURGLARY (76-6-202 UCA), a felony of the second degree, as 
follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did 
enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a 
dwelling with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an 
assault on any person. 
COUNT TWO 
THEFT (76-6-404 UCA), a felony of the second degree, as 
follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did 
obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, said property 
having a value exceeding $1,000.00. 
This Information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Glenn Parker, Dave Fluckiger, Alan Pratt, 
MVJLVQ wxtn the Davis County Sheriff's Office and 
that he bases this Information on the following: 
1. On the 24th day of March, 1987, Dennis Bingham reported 
to the Davis County Sheriff's Office that he had discovered that 
his mother and step-father's residence at 3510 West 1300 North, 
West Point, Davis County, Utah, had been burglarized, entry having 
apparently been made through a broken window in the door. The 
house had last been secured on the evening of March 22, 1987. 
2. Lee Thompson, whose residence was burglarized, provided 
affiant with a list of the items stolen and their values; the total 
value of all items taken was over $16,000.00. 
3. Affiant observed the scene of the burglary; two 
screwdrivers were found in the house, one on a TV/VCR stand (from 
which the VCR had been removed), and the other about a foot from a 
filing cabinet which had been locked, but pried open during the 
burglary; Shelly Powell, a daughter of a woman who lived with 
Charley Massey, the defendant, later identified both screwdrivers 
as belonging to the defendant. 
4. Kathleen Massey, who lives with the defendant, reported 
to affiant that the defendant left on the afternoon of March 24, 
1987, and she has not seen him since. 
Affiant 
Screened by: J. Mark Andrus 
Assigned to: J. Mark Andrus 
(* 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that 
the person in possession stole the property. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of 
property, (2) that the property was stolen, (3) that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time from the theft, 
and (4) that no satisfactory explanation of such possession has 
been given or appears from the evidence, then you may infer from 
those facts and find that the defendant stole the property. 
4 
